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1. INTRODUCTION 
The design of any system interacting with the signalling 
infrastructure of railways implies the integration of safety 
requirements. The case of surveillance systems for level 
crossings (LC) is a clear example of how a system can be deeply 
affected by such an issue. Different techniques can be exploited 
for the design of an LC monitoring system, nevertheless the 
advantages with respect to the drawbacks of each possible 
technical solution should be weighted towards the safety 
constraints before actual implementation. In particular highly 
performing solutions may result in unfeasible designs when 
considering safety requirements. 
Usually the approaches followed for safe system design 
derive from the standard in [1] and on minor modifications of 
previous designs for similar applications, as in [2]-[4]. 
According    to   these   guidelines,    software,    hardware   and  
 
 
 
 
communication issues are taken into consideration in granting 
the needed safety targets. 
What happens in practice is that designers when following 
the applicable standards often do not include important 
problems, which cannot specifically be related to these three 
main categories, but rather to the physical realization of the 
system and above all to its interactions with the environment. 
This is due to a lack in the preliminary problem analysis [1]-[4]. 
Some authors, tried to approach the problem just in terms of 
system performance as [5], [6] neglecting to design the system 
in order to meet the minimum safety requirements. Others as 
[7]-[9] used the standard approach to safety design trying to 
exploit reliability block diagram methods or fault tree analysis 
resulting in a partial problem overview. Of course, this kind of 
approach is important and is a fundamental aspect of a safety 
design but, in many cases, it is not sufficient: the safety 
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assessment for a complex system needs in addition a deep 
application scenario analysis. 
Speaking of monitoring or surveillance system design, in 
general, a mixture of different aspects as described in [10]-[20] 
should be considered, depending heavily on the specific 
technology used for all the components, with a special attention 
to the sensor technology which tremendously affects the overall 
system safety integrity. 
In this paper the problem of designing a monitoring system 
for railway LCs taking into account all the safety requirements 
is discussed. In particular a roadmap on the needed steps is 
provided to meet the highest safety degree required by 
commonly used standards [1-4]. 
The approach followed in this paper, is to consider the 
safety allocation and requirements as pre-established values 
which have to be satisfied according to the selected LC 
application. Alternatively, in what follows, the allocation phase 
outcomes are considered as problem given inputs. The 
allocation analysis and the failure modes analysis are therefore 
not performed. The requirements in terms of safety integrity 
level and tolerable hazard rate are taken as given values. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the general 
safety theory is presented and a generalized approach to apply it 
to railway monitoring and interfacing system is provided. A 
general description of the most used standards is supplied as 
well. In Section 3 a case study is presented, based on radar 
technology, by using this specific example it is possible to 
discuss how all safety aspects, also those not explicitly 
mentioned in the standards, impact on the system design. 
Finally, the conclusions are presented. 
2. THEORY OF SAFETY DESIGN OF RAILWAY MONITORING 
SYSTEMS 
This section aims at the definition of the approach which 
should be followed when designing a complex system, such as 
an LC monitoring system, satisfying a pre-established safety 
level. 
In particular for railway level crossing systems (LCS) SIL4 is 
the requirement to be met. 
The problem is usually approached through a top-down 
analysis. Several tools can be used and merged at this level as 
suggested in [8], [9]. Usually to act effectively on a complex 
problem, decomposition in hardware, software and 
communication infrastructures is followed, which implies the 
division of the system into subsystems interconnected through 
a diagram representation as proposed in Figure 1, where the 
proposed blocks identify both hardware and software 
components interacting through the communication 
infrastructure to generate a composite fail safe system. 
Actually the highest safety degree which can be claimed by 
these structures considered into continuous operating mode [1]-
[4] depends on the maturity of the hardware technology and its 
specific design, on system software-hardware integration and 
diagnostic coverage design and on other factors too. 
It has to be underlined, however that, in many complex 
applications such as the one considered in this paper for the 
detection of obstacles in railway LCs, there are some aspects 
going far beyond the simple involvement of both hardware and 
software, as it will be discussed later. 
Starting from the system decomposition, to address safety 
study, the roadmap shown in Figure 2 is followed. 
The first step addresses the system conceptual design 
through a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA). Then the safety 
requirements identified for the specific application jointly with 
the design requirements are used to build the final system 
specification meant in terms of both functional and RAMS 
requirements. Once the preliminary design is completed a 
detailed low level (system and subsystems) hazard analysis (HA) 
is performed and the countermeasures for the specific 
application identified and managed as detailed safety 
requirements for subsequent safety allocation. After the safety 
analysis is conducted and the safety case is managed, then the 
final system is designed and verified and retrofitted according 
to the evaluation phase outcomes. In the validation phase both 
the Tolerable Hazard Risk (THR) or Probability of Failure on 
Demand (PFD) in continuous applications are evaluated and 
compared with the safety levels allocated in the previous steps 
[1]-[4]. The key point of the proposed scheme (in Figure 2) is 
that addressing hardware and software and their mutual 
integration may allow, in principle, to achieve the safety targets 
and cover the identified safety needs requested by each 
designed function. Nevertheless, in practice, there are a 
multitude of cases where the system design is “application 
dependent” needing to address specific physics or scenario 
assumptions. The avoidance of such approach may result in 
critical and poor design where just a partial risk mitigation takes 
place. In what follows a sample case study of a monitoring 
system for LCs based on radar technology is treated in order to 
show how apparently, by considering only the hardware safety 
the pre-established SIL targets seems to be achieved, but the 
 
Figure 2. Roadmap to be followed during the design phase of a SIL 4 safety 
related application. 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of the sub-systems composing an LCS. 
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scenario or the physical interaction with the environment may 
actually influence the safety of the overall system. Hence 
neglecting these aspects leads to an unsafe system design and to 
wrong conclusions. Modifications of the initially proposed 
architecture are also discussed as possible solutions to cope 
with safety requirements which cannot alternatively be met 
once issues linked to the specific scenario are introduced. In 
this paper, in particular, considerations on missed detection 
probability and on under threshold objects presence in the 
scenario, may result in jeopardizing exogenous contributions to 
the achievement of safety target. 
3. CASE STUDY: RADAR MONITORING SYSTEM FOR A 
RAYLWAY LCS 
Several technologies can be exploited to implement a 
monitoring or surveillance system for LC structures. Each one 
has its own peculiarity in terms of sensitivity and detection 
capabilities and of course some pitfalls. In this manuscript the 
authors decided to use, as a case study, a specific short-range 
radar architecture exploiting frequency modulated continuous 
wave (FMCW) technology, which has proved to be a promising 
solution due to its simple working principle. The operating 
frequency 24 GHz ISM-Band (250 MHz) was chosen for this 
application. 
3.1.  Hardware and Software Structures 
The general hardware architecture is the one depicted in 
Figure 3. 
The radar sensor is a Linear-FMCW system, equipped with a 
single transmitter and two receivers with the receiving antennas 
placed at the distance D. Signals received by the receiving 
antennas are processed (demodulated by I/Q system), filtered, 
sampled, acquired and post-processed.  
The transmitting antenna radiates an electromagnetic wave 
with frequency sweeping linearly from a low frequency (fmin) up 
to a maximum one (fmax) in the time interval (Tc). The wave 
reflected by the target is received by the two receiving antennas 
and the transmitted signal is used to down-convert the received 
signals to baseband. Each beat signal gives the frequency 
difference between the transmitted and the reflected waves, 
which in turn is proportional to the distance R between each 
antenna and the detected object. 
Figure 4 illustrates the periodic saw-wave function (upper 
plots) which is the modulating signal of the FM transmitted 
(blue), the frequency of received signal (red) and the beat 
frequency (lower plot) vs. time. With reference to Figure 4, R 
can be determined using equation (1). 
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where Bs=(fmax-fmin) is the sweep bandwidth and ∆f
 
is the 
measured frequency difference. 
The relative motion of the object with respect to the radar 
sensor can be detected since it causes a Doppler frequency shift 
of the received signal frequency. 
Using two receiving channels allows to estimate also the 
angular position of an object considering it constrained on a 
plane, exploiting spatial diversity and combining the two 
measured distances. 
Summarizing, with the sensor and monitoring system in 
Figure 3, range, angle position and, if needed, relative velocity 
can be estimated through proper (complex) processing 
algorithms on the demodulated and sampled radar signals [12]. 
A processing/controller unit has the task of controlling the 
sensor operations, of processing acquired signals and finally of 
comparing the estimated received signal power with a proper 
threshold value in order to detect the presence of an obstacle. 
Once the angular position of the target and the distance have 
been determined the data is transmitted on a physical support 
(which can be either traditional copper wiring or optical fiber) 
to another processing unit for the data post-processing and 
final decision on the occupancy of the level crossing. 
Following the guidelines in the standards, the safety 
performance of the described system depends on the failures of 
the hardware (antennas, conditioning electronics, acquisition 
electronics, control and processing unit), of the software 
components (control of the hardware operations, data 
processing, data managing) and of the data transmission 
systems. 
3.2. Safe Conceptual Design, Testing and Validation 
For shortness, in this section, the discussion is limited to the 
hardware and the data transmission system proposed for this 
specific application, whereas the aspects concerning the safety 
of software components will not be treated. 
For the evaluation of the system THR, using the safety 
analysis performed during the system design, the safety function 
 
Figure 3. FMCW structure with one transmitter and two receivers. The 
presence of two receivers enables to detect both target distance and 
angular position. 
 
Figure 4. Above: frequencies of the transmitted and received signals as a 
function of time. Below: frequency difference. 
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involving the highest complexity in terms of dangerous failure 
rates, lower diagnostic coverage and highest number of critical 
components is evaluated. 
Usually such approach should not be followed due to the 
fact that on safety matters 100 % coverage should be followed 
for safety function evaluation. Nevertheless depending on the 
designer and assessor experience it is reasonably correct to take 
into considerations the functions that more than others may be 
involved in granting the system safety and integrity due to the 
peculiar system definition and operating conditions. The main 
function of this system is to change the status of the signaling 
system from the safe state (red light), which is adopted in all the 
situations, to the unsafe state (green light) if and only if the 
system has not detected any object in the LCS specific area 
once the barriers are closed within a specified scanning time 
(max. 7s). 
The corruption of this function can lead to the most critical 
outcomes in terms of severity. 
Such function is performed by the following items: 
• Radar sub-system 
• Data processing and management 
• I/O interface board 
As mentioned in the previous sections the required system 
SIL for railway signaling applications is 4. This safety level can 
be hardly reached by a single item specifically designed for a 
new application as described also in the IEC61508 standard. 
The use of multiple items can therefore be exploited to grant 
the required safety level and to increase the detection 
capabilities. 
The corresponding functional block diagram is the one 
depicted in Figure 5. In such system the Radar sub-system is 
represented at least with two radars but it can be set up with 
any devices number. 
The Data processing and management is defined as 2oo2 
Main Board [1]-[4] due to the fact that the architecture has to 
be “composite fail-safe”. The board is equipped with two 
processors [10] which are devoted to the evaluation of each 
radar signal content enabling the system to drive the I/O 
interface, if and only if, there is no reasonable doubt to have 
correctly scanned the area. The I/O output board has at least 
two outputs driving the energized sides of an actuator in order 
to send a signal only in case both the CPU on the main 
processing board give consensus to the change of the system 
from safe state (red light for train passage) to actuated state 
(green light to train passage). 
Such architecture allows in case of failure of one unit (CPU 
or Radar or I/O output) to interrupt the communication 
avoiding the inappropriate driving of the signaling system. In 
Figure 6 the corresponding reliability block diagram (RBD) is 
derived from the system mission definition referring to the 
blocks of Figure 5. The overall system is treated as a reliability 
series due to the fact that the failure of any item contributing to 
the safety function coverage implies the missing of the safety 
requirements. 
Once the working environment has been defined (for this 
application is 40 °C and Ground Fixed), the failure rates can be 
derived exploiting the MIL-HDBK-217F database, while the 
repair rates have been assessed on the basis of similar 
applications, referring to the specific system hardware. 
 For the SIL evaluation (THR according to the needed 
standard [1]-[4]) an homogeneous first order memoryless 
Markovian model has been implemented in the case of two 
radar systems. The number of states necessary to evaluate the 
system safety integrity level has been reduced to a minimum of 
three in this specific scenario. This simplified representation 
can be successfully exploited for the problem because any 
Markov model can be reduced if the proper aggregation 
procedure on failure rates is considered. Moreover this kind of 
scheme results in a conservative diagram with respect to 
different and more complex ones. 
In Figure 7 the obtained Markov model (Figure 6) is 
represented, in which the state W represents the system 
working condition, DD corresponds to the state in which the 
system has experienced a detected dangerous failure, which 
does not affect the system safety function, finally DU 
represents a undetected dangerous failure with consequent loss 
of safety coverage. The diagnostic coverage of the system has 
been considered to be 99 % due to a set of software self-tests 
performing hardware checks. The aggregated failure rates and 
repair rates, obtained from the analysis of the overall system as 
mentioned above, and needed to describe the transitions among 
the three states, are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Figure 6. Reliability representation (RBD) of the proposed detection system 
based on radar sensing technology (case of two radar systems). 
 
Figure 5. Functional representation of the proposed detection system based 
on radar sensing technology (case of two radar systems). 
 
Figure 7. Markovian homogeneous diagram of the system proposed in 
Figure 6. 
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 Starting from the failure rates (λXX, XX=DU, DD) and 
repair rate (µ), the transition matrix T can be evaluated 
substituting the proper detected and undetected dangerous 
failure and repair rates into the corresponding diagram symbols 
of Figure 7 obtaining (2): 
  𝑇 = �1 − (𝑎 + 𝑏)∆𝑡 𝑎∆𝑡 𝑏∆𝑡𝜇∆𝑡 1 − 𝜇∆𝑡 00 0 1 � , (2) 
where: 
𝑎 = 2𝜆𝐷𝐷1 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷2 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷3 
𝑏 = 2𝜆𝐷𝐷1 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷2 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷3 
The matrix defined in (2) relates the state probabilities at 
time t with the state probabilities after a certain discrete time 
increment ∆t as per (3) 
�
𝑃𝑊(𝑡 + ∆𝑡)
𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡 + ∆𝑡)
𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡 + ∆𝑡)� = [𝑇]′ � 𝑃𝑊(𝑡)𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡)𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡)� . (3) 
The differential equations describing the system dynamics 
can be derived from (3) as shown in (4). 
lim∆𝑡→0
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑃𝑊(𝑡+∆𝑡)−𝑃𝑊(𝑡)
∆𝑡
= −(𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑃𝑊(𝑡) + 𝜇𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡)
𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡+∆𝑡)−𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡)
∆𝑡
= 𝑎𝑃𝑊(𝑡) − 𝜇𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡)
𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡+∆𝑡)−𝑃𝐷𝐷(𝑡)
∆𝑡
= 𝑏𝑃𝑊(𝑡) ⎭⎪⎬
⎪
⎫
   (4) 
Using the values of Table 1, it is possible to evaluate the 
probability of being in the state of DU within one hour. Such 
probability for continuous operating system claiming a SIL 4 
should be lower than 10-8 (THR <10-8 1/hr). The case study 
exploiting two FMCW radars hardware implementation satisfies 
the requirements needed for signaling railway systems as can be 
seen in Figure 8. Anyway the configuration selected for the two 
radars is a functional 1oo2 from a safety standpoint, to take into 
account that the two radars are observing the same scene from 
different viewpoints. Nevertheless the resulting model 
corresponding to the Markov diagram of Figure 7 is a 
conservative representation of the proposed configuration and 
can be therefore considered as representative of a worst case 
condition. 
The behavior of PDU confirms that such probability within 
the first hour is never larger than what is required by the 
standards [1]-[4]. Looking the plots in Figure 8 it is evident that, 
within the considered time interval, the probability reaches a 
value close to the limit set by the standard. This can appear as a 
dangerous situation since apparently there is a little safety 
margin. Nevertheless it should be reminded that the threshold 
values suggested by the standards include a sufficient safety 
margin, and, according to [1]-[4] remain sufficient to accept the 
proposed design. In any case the results shown in Figure 8 are 
obtained considering a specific sensor redundancy and scenario, 
but the approach used is generally valid. It is possible to add 
other sensors increasing the margin with respect to the standard 
probability threshold. 
3.3. Safety issues related to the sensing system and application 
scenario 
After having evaluated the impact on safety design of the 
hardware implementation it is important to analyze and take 
into account the influence of the sensing system devoted to the 
obstacle detection with reference to the case study. In a radar 
sensor, the detection of an object in a monitored area is based 
on the measurement of the power reflected back to the 
receiving antenna by the object, when illuminated by an 
electromagnetic wave from the transmitting antenna. The radar 
detection process involves making decisions based on a set of 
“return power” measurements. Obviously, due to the presence 
of noise in the received signals, an error-free decision is not 
always possible, so on analogy to what happens when studying 
the hardware or software implementation, to evaluate the 
sensing system safety level, the problem is treated in a statistic 
framework. 
Let’s define the following quantities: 
1. Pfa (false alarm probability): it is intended as the 
probability to declare an object present when it is 
not actually present. 
2. Pd (detection probability): it is the probability to 
declare an object present when it is actually present 
on the scene. 
The probability of declaring an object absent when it is 
actually present on the scene of interest is defined as the 
probability of missed detection Pmd and can be derived from the 
previous definition as Pmd=1-Pd. 
Radar systems, even if providing excellent performances, 
cannot grant 100 % object detection probability as well as a 
false alarm rate equal to zero. 
In the present work authors tried to combine the probability 
of missed detection (PMD) with the standard SIL evaluation in 
order to assume that the composed SIL (SILC) level is 
matched, if both the PMD and the hardware SIL are within the 
required probability window of a specific safety allocated target 
(for this example SIL4 of PMD=PFD<10-4 for on demand mode 
operating systems). 
In the studied case, it is possible to derive the probability of 
missed detection of the proposed radar on the basis of some 
simple and generic assumptions. 
Table 1. Dangerous detectable and undetectable failure rates of the 
subsystem components. 
 𝛌𝐃𝐃[g/h] 𝛌𝐃𝐃[g/h] 
Radar 2.2853e-007 2.3084e-009 
2oo2 Main Board 2.7423e-007 2.7700e-009 
I/O 1.7395e-007 1.7570e-009 
 
Figure 8. Probability dynamic behavior of the proposed homogenous 
Markovian system. 
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Usually when radars are involved the Neyman-Pearson 
criteria is used for such determination. To minimize the Pfa and 
maximize Pd at the same time can result in some cases in an 
unfeasible problem. The two above defined probabilities for the 
threshold based decision algorithm can be related by means of 
the so called ROC (Receiving Operating Characteristic) curves. 
Each curve is the plot of Pd(T) versus Pfa(T), when varying T 
(threshold level) at a given signal to noise ratio at the output of 
the radar system, SNRout. 
If we assume that the noise is Gaussian distributed such 
ROC curves [22], [23] for a coherent receiver and for a single 
pulse can be expressed by (5): 
[ ]22
2
1 1 /SNR)P(erfcerfcP outfad −=
−
 (5)  
where erfc() is the complement of the error function  
Moreover, in case of free space propagation, the receiver 
input power, Prin, can be written as: 
( )
( ) 43
2
4 R
GGPP rttinr
π
σλ
=
 (6) 
where Pt is the transmitted power, Gt and Gr are the gain of the 
transmitting and receiving antennas, λ is the wavelength of the 
transmitted wave and σ is the target radar cross-section. It can 
be seen that the power received from the target depends 
linearly on the radar cross section, which results in a measure of 
the detectability of the target; this parameter depends on the 
object size, orientation, shape and surface characteristics. 
Note that the detection system is aimed at detecting only 
dangerous objects, named hereafter targets to be detected 
(TTD), i.e. static targets large enough to cause an accident when 
the train passes (such as vehicles) correspondingly there will be 
a minimum radar cross section to be taken into account in the 
design. Objects with a smaller radar cross section (e.g. small 
animals), have not to be detected, in order to avoid useless 
stops of the train traffic reducing the overall railway network 
availability. 
An estimation of the noise due to the receiver architecture 
can be obtained using the characterization data in Table 2 
obtained, for the used radar, by measurements in an anechoic 
environment. 
Using Data of Table 2, such power is given by the following 
equation: 
56.77)(
[mW] 10753.1 8
−=
⋅= −
dBmP
P
in
r
in
r  (7) 
If the receiver is characterized by a noise figure Fr, the 
receiver output SNRout ratio can be evaluated exploiting (8) 
nr
in
r
out PF
PSNR =1
 (8) 
where Pn is the input noise power. The noise due to the 
receiver can be therefore estimated according to eq.(8). 
Again exploiting data of Table II it is possible to compute 
the noise introduced by the receiver as (9): 
56.117)(
1075.1 15
−=
⋅= −
mnr
nr
dBPF
PF . (9) 
Once found this value from the characterization 
measurements, (8) can be used to find a theoretical estimate of 
the receiver SNRout when varying the distance radar-target or 
the radar cross section.  
In particular if the maximum distance from the radar to an 
object in the LC area is considered as the distance R, and if the 
cross-area of the smallest dangerous obstacle is considered, the 
minimum output signal to noise ratio, (dB) min,outSNR  related to 
the presence of a TTD in the scene can be found. This 
minimum signal to noise ratio value allows for selecting the 
threshold for the detection of an object in the scene. 
 In Table 3 data concerning the four limit situations to be 
considered in the case study are reported: two possible 
maximum distances (for two possible areas of LCs) and two 
minimum radar cross sections (selected as the cross-area of the 
smallest TTD). 
The false alarm probability, which has no direct impact on 
the safety level, can be a priori established by the system end 
user. In this case the authors assumed that the system should 
declare only once per year that an object is on the scene when 
actually it is not present. Supposing a working time of 5000 
hours per year this corresponds to a Pfa= 2x10-4 (fixing the 
threshold of 12 dB). 
The plot in Figure 9 shows the detection probability, Pd, for 
the considered radar, obtained from the ROC curves (at 
different SNRout) that relate Pfa and Pd, keeping Pfa= 2x10-4. 
As far as safety level is concerned, instead, due to the fact 
that the desired SIL level is 4, the Pd should fulfill the SIL 4 
requirements (Pd =0.9999). Exploiting the curve of Figure 9 it is 
possible to determine that such value is reasonable if the 
receiver has a SNR=17dB which corresponds to a detectable 
object with a minimum radar cross section of 0.63 m2 within 25 
m distance, in ideal conditions. However in a real scenario, the 
detection system capability depends also on the presence of 
clutter (non-Gaussian noise), which degrades the SNR. This 
problem is usually mitigated by clutter cancellation techniques, 
such as integration over multiple scans [23]. In the present case 
two radars are used to monitor the same scene from different 
positions so the overall probability of missed detection is the 
product of the two probability, counterbalancing the effect of 
clutter. Numerical evaluation shows that the target limits are 
respected. 
Even if the probability of missed detection fulfills the 
requirements for a SIL4 system, there is another issue that has 
Table 3 Data corresponding to different conditions: two minimum σ and 
two maximum distances for the target. 
σmin (m2) (m) maxR  (dBm) inmin,rP  (dB) 
in
min,outSNR  
0.31  30 -105.5 12 
0.31 25 -102.3 15.2 
0.63 30 -102.5 15 
0.63 25 -99.3 18.2 
Table 2 Characterization Data for the Radar sensor. 
Parameter Value 
Measured signal to noise ratio (SNR) 40 dB 
Measurement Distance, R 8 m 
Target radar cross section, σ 1 m2 
Transmission Power EIRP (PtGt) 20 dBm 
Receiver Antenna Gain, Gr 9,6 dB 
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to be considered to grant the desired safety level. 
In fact the detection system is designed to detect only 
dangerous objects, TTDs, on the other hand objects with a 
smaller σ (e.g. small animals), have not to be detected. 
Nevertheless a non-detectable object placed on the scene may 
cause safety problems when in the optical path between the 
sensor and a TTD. In this case, in fact, the under threshold 
target (UTT) can mask the TTD due to signal attenuation. 
Therefore even if this kind of scenario is not described in the 
applied standard it can represent an hazard whose effect has to 
be modeled and quantified in order to be included in the final 
calculation of the missed detection probability. 
In the following, the authors assessed the probability of a 
missed detection due to the presence of an UTT masking the 
TTD in a worst case framework, based on the spatial resolution 
characteristics of the case study radar detection system. 
In analyzing the problem we consider the LC area split by a 
mesh defined considering the range and angular resolutions of 
the radar system, ∆θ and ∆ρ, (see Figure 10), so that the scene 
is covered by a grid of resolution cells that can be referenced by 
an angular index, θ, and range one, ρ, being impossible to 
distinguish two targets which are located inside the same cell. 
Assuming that the UTT occupies a single radar resolution 
cell, to perform the calculation in the worst case it was assumed 
that also the TTD occupies a single cell irrespective of its 
distance from the radar sensor. This is clearly a pessimistic 
scenario because a vehicle radar cross section will occupy more 
than a single cell. Note that fixing the cell number occupied by 
an object irrespective of the object position in the scene, is 
indeed a simplification, because the resolution cell has a variable 
area. In any case considering the furthest cells area when fixing 
the number of cells occupied by the targets gives a worst case 
scenario. 
In the LC monitoring system a dedicated reference object is 
placed in front of each radar sensor on the opposite side of the 
monitored area, which has always to be detected and allows also 
for taking into account environmental parameter variations 
(temperature compensation, rain etc…). 
It is assumed that the unwanted object can never lay on the 
optical path connecting the radar to its reference object because 
in this case the absence of the detection will bring the system in 
a safe state. 
Considering the grid made up of Nθ angular division, and Nρ 
range division, we assume a uniform probability for an object 
(both TTD and UTT) to be in a certain cell (ρ, θ) given by Pρ,𝜃 = 1Nθ𝑁𝜌 . (7) 
For one radar the probability of missing the detection of a 
TTD can be evaluated as follows: 
𝑃𝑀𝐷 = 𝑃𝑁𝐷𝑃{𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑒}, (8) 
where PND is the probability the object is in the scene (in the 
LCS area) but it is not detected due to the presence of an UTT. 
To find PND we consider the following equation: 
𝑃𝑁𝐷 = ∑ 𝑃′𝜌,𝜃𝜌,𝜃 𝑃{𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑐 𝜌,𝜃 }, (9) 
𝑃′𝜌,𝜃 = 𝑃{𝑈𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑐 𝑜𝑎𝑡ℎ|𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑐 𝜌,𝜃}. 
The conditional probability 𝑃𝜌,𝜃′  can be easily evaluated 
considering that it corresponds to:  
𝑃′𝜌,𝜃 = 𝑃 {𝑈𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖 𝜃,𝑅 < 𝜌} =  ∑ 𝑜𝜃,𝑅𝑅<𝜌  (10) 
where R represents the distance of the UTT. 
In Figure 11 the value of 𝑃′𝜌,𝜃 is color coded, obviously it 
increases with the distance of the TTD from the radar, in this 
figure the optical path to the reference object is assigned a 𝑃′𝜌,𝜃 
equal to zero. Note that 𝑃′𝜌,𝜃 is always smaller than 1/Nθ. 
So with this very simple approach we can write: 
𝑃𝑁𝐷 = ∑ ∑ 𝑃′𝜌,𝜃 1𝑁𝜌𝑁𝜃𝜃𝜌 = ∑ ∑ 𝑜𝜃,𝑅𝑅<𝜌𝜌 1𝑁𝜌 =
1
𝑁𝜃𝑁𝜌
2 (𝑁𝜌�𝑁𝜌−1�2 − 1 ) < 1𝑁𝜃 (11) 
where we considered all the events ‘the DDT is not detected 
but in the scene mutually' exclusive events. 
These very simple results give a rule of thumb, which is 
obvious: by increasing the angular resolution the missed 
detection probability decreases. Actually this remains true only 
if the radar cross section of the UTT allows it to remain in a 
 
Figure 9. Probability of detection of a target under the assumption Pfa= 
2x10-4. 
 
Figure 10. Cell distribution of a single radar sensor on a 6x6 m2 area (LCS 
area) considering 2° of angular resolution and 60 cm range resolution for 
the selected bandwidth of 250 MHz. 
Radar position
(ρ,θ)
0
Nθ
0
Nρ
Reference object
TTD
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resolution cell, otherwise the probability PND depends on the 
angular aperture determined by the cross section. 
The designer can evaluate how the sensor redundancy 
mitigates this type of missed detection. In fact by using more 
than one sensor the missed detection due to a single UTT is 
avoided since the lines of sight from the TTD to the radar 
systems are different. In case of N radar systems the missed 
detection can be caused only by the simultaneous presence of 
N UTTs obscuring the three lines of sight. 
Such a situation can be described by the joint probability of 
N independent conditioned events, each described by the same 
𝑃′𝜌,𝜃. In the analyzed case PND is close to 10-4 for the scenario 
with two radars whereas three radars PND give a value close to 
10-6 which is a satisfactory result according to PFD 
requirements. 
In the last case, the overall probability of failure on demand 
(PFD), which corresponds to the probability of missed 
detection due to the presence of three UTTs in the scene (PMD) 
is given by the product of the estimated PND and P{TTD in the 
scene}. This latter quantity is an a priory value obtained from the 
analysis of the historical data for train. To grant the 
performance of a SIL 4 system it has to be smaller than 1/10. 
The conditional probability obtained with three different 
radars placed at the three corners of the LCS area is shown in 
Figure 12. 
In the more realistic case a TTD occupies more than a 
resolution cell, while the UTT occupies 1 cell, therefore a 
modified approach can be followed. Assuming that the TTD 
occupies KxK cells, if the value of 𝑃′𝜌,𝜃 is evaluated using (10) 
again, but considering an angular resolution ∆θ’=K∆θ and a 
range resolution ∆ρ’=K∆ρ. Therefore the following inequality 
holds: 
𝑃𝜌,𝜃′ = ∑ 𝑜𝜃,𝑅𝑅<𝜌 < 1𝑁𝜃′ = 𝐾𝑁𝜃 (12) 
Note that this probability is not anymore the probability of 
having the DDT in the position (ρ,θ) masked, but the 
probability that if the DDT is in (ρ,θ) than a UDT (occupying 
only 1/K2 of the cell) is in the cells on the line from the DDT 
to the radar. So the conditional probability of having the DDT 
in (ρ,θ) masked is the probability of having at the same time at 
least K UDTs in the same cell (ρ,θ) aligned so to mask the 
object. Hence we have: 
𝑃𝜌,𝜃𝐾 = 𝑃{𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑚| 𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖 (𝜌,𝜃)} = = (𝑃𝜌,𝜃′ 𝐾) (𝐾−1)!𝑘𝑘−1  < � 𝐾𝑁𝜃�𝐾. (13) 
So if K < Nθ we have a reduced conditional probability, as 
expected. The probability PND is obtained in the same way as 
before (considering ∆θ’ and ∆ρ’). In the case taken into 
account, by choosing a value K = 2 (and three radar) the value 
of PND is far smaller than 10-8, so in this case irrespective of the 
actual value of the a priori probability of having K×N UDTs on 
the scene the SIL 4 requirements are fulfilled. Note that K=2 is 
a really cautious value for the radar cross section of any 
dangerous object (vehicle). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper the authors presented a case study to analyze 
the problem of designing a safe monitoring system for level 
crossing using radar technology. In the present manuscript a 
strategy to manage the problem was proposed and an extensive 
evaluation of a possible configuration satisfying SIL 4 
requirement was illustrated. 
In the paper, analyzing a case study concerning a railway 
crossing monitoring system based on FMCW radar technology, 
a specific configuration has been suggested in order to satisfy 
the safety constraints provided by the standard. The analysis of 
this special case allowed for highlighting how a safety study 
based on the analysis of component failure only, is not 
sufficient, and can be in a certain way misleading if the overall 
scenario is not taken into consideration. In particular it has 
been shown that it is important to analyze and take into 
account the influence of the sensing system and its interaction 
with the environment. In the studied case, for instance, it has 
been shown how the probability of missed detection of a 
Figure 11. 𝑃′𝜌,𝜃 represented as a function of the position in grid. The value 
of the probability is color coded. The dark line represents the forbidden 
area where the UTT is masking the reference object with a consequent safe 
state determination. 
 
Figure 12. conditional probability 𝑃′𝜌,𝜃 given by three UTTs. 
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dangerous obstacle due both to the radar performance and to 
the presence on the scene of small undetectable obstacles have 
to be modeled and evaluated in order to obtain a SIL4 
monitoring system. 
Moreover it has been shown that a safety design has to find a 
good tradeoff among functional requirements, overall system 
complexity, and safety parameters. 
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